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Many countries used public funds to bail out struggling banks at the onset of the financial crisis. Now, with
austerity still biting, the chances of further bank bailouts by national authorities are relatively slim.
Clemens Fuest examines Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier’s recent proposals for the
European Commission to take responsibility for bank restructuring and the creation of a European
bank resolution fund. While he finds the proposals to be sound, he also argues that the issue of
large numbers of non-performing loans held by countries in the Eurozone’s periphery must first be
solved, and banks and depositors in the core region need to be convinced of the benefits of risk
sharing. 
What is the minimum amount of political integration required to allow the Eurozone to survive? Views about the
answer to this question differ widely, but many people agree that the creation of a banking union is part of that
minimum requirement. The concept of banking union includes four elements: banking regulation, banking
supervision, bank resolution or restructuring, and deposit insurance. While all of these elements should be
organized at the supranational or Eurozone level, the role of the public sector in designing and financing these
different elements is subject to debate. So far, progress has been made with regard to the first two elements –
common banking regulation, which is covered by the fourth Capital Requirements Directive, and common banking
supervision, which will be taken over by the ECB.
For the third element, the resolution or restructuring of failed banks, Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier
has made a bold proposal. He wants the European Commission to take on the responsibility to trigger and carry out
bank restructurings, and he wants to introduce a European bank resolution fund. Why?
Internal Market Commissioner Michael Barnier Credit: European People’s Party (Creative Commons
BY)
Currently the stabilization and restructuring of failed banks is a responsibility of national governments. Michel
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Barnier argues that this raises three issues:
First, in the recent economic crisis, many countries have used public funds to bail out failing banks. This has
increased government debt, adding to the financial difficulties of the public sector caused by the economic
downturn. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt have questioned the ability of governments to finance
further bank bailouts, leading to a downward spiral of declining trust in the financial solidity of both national
governments and national banking systems.
Second, given the high degree of economic integration in Europe, bank resolution in one country has important
economic effects on other countries, and national governments may not take these effects into account
appropriately when they deal with banking crises.
Third, banks residing in countries with more solid public finances will benefit from lower funding costs than banks
from countries with highly indebted governments because investors will expect that the former are more likely to be
backed by their governments in the event of a banking crisis than the latter. This distorts competition between banks
in the European Internal Market.
To address these issues, Barnier suggests the following changes. The responsibility to trigger and carry out bank
resolutions will be taken over by the European Commission. Losses incurred will be borne primarily by shareholders
and creditors of banks. If additional funds are needed, they will be provided by a newly created fund. This fund will
be financed via contributions levied from all banks in the participating countries. It can borrow and service the debt
with future contributions. The idea is that this fund will only be used if private creditors of the bank have at least
absorbed losses amounting to 8 per cent of the bank’s overall liabilities.
Some of the principles guiding the proposal are very reasonable and will enjoy widespread support. This applies in
particular to the idea that private investors should bear the losses of failed banks, not the taxpayers. Of course,
endorsing this principle is not the same as putting it into practice. In order to make this work the concepts in the
proposal need to be pushed further. It is not enough to stipulate that there should be a minimum contribution of
private investors. Such a bail-in will only happen if it does not undermine financial stability. To ensure that each bank
should be obliged to demonstrate that enough of its capital is held by investors which are able to absorb losses. This
could be pension funds or life insurance companies with a long investment horizon, which can take losses and make
up for them over time. Clearly, financial liabilities labeled as ‘bail-inable’ debt will be costly, so that banks will want to
minimize their use. Therefore regulation and effective supervision is required which makes sure that all banks have
a minimum level of liabilities that can be written down or converted without risking a crisis of the financial system.
Figure 1: Share of non-performing loans 2000-2013 (as a percentage of the loan portfolio)
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While these adjustments can be made relatively easily, there is another issue which is much more difficult. The
proposal introduces an element of joint liability for all banks in the participating countries which may have drastic
consequences. The current economic situation is highly asymmetric. One indicator of this asymmetry is the share of
credits in the national banking systems (see Figure 1, above). Banks from countries in the core of the Eurozone and
their depositors will have little appetite to enter a European resolution fund arrangement. The reason is that this
arrangement might force them to bear a large part of the unrealized losses lurking in the balance sheets of banks in
the periphery.
How can this be addressed? It would be necessary to carry out an asset review which provides a realistic
assessment of the quality of existing bank assets. The ECB plans to undertake such an assessment in 2014, but the
question is whether it will be carried out in a way that convinces the banks and depositors in all participating
countries that entering a risk sharing arrangement is a good idea. If it is, it will involve a considerable writedown of
existing asset values, and the losses will have to be borne by existing shareholders and creditors of banks. At least
this is what the principles guiding the European banking union project suggest.
Alternatively, national governments could engage in yet another round of bank bailouts, but that would probably be
politically infeasible. Given this, an asset review which convinces enough people that more risk sharing is
acceptable is likely to spook capital markets. Finding a solution to this ‘legacy asset’ issue is difficult and requires the
will to compromise and the courage to do unpopular things. But before this is achieved, concepts like the Barnier
proposal are doomed to fail.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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